United States v. Benkahla: Illustrating the Need for Reform

Steven A. Book

In United States v. Benkahla, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether Sabri Benkahla, who was convicted of obstructing grand jury and FBI investigations concerning terrorists and terrorist groups, qualified for the obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement under United States Sentencing Guideline Manual Section 3A1.4, Application Note 2. At Benkahla's sentencing, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that Benkahla qualified for the terrorism enhancement despite the absence of case law with respect to the obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement and even though the effect of the enhancement was “unequivocally severe.” The district court even declared, “Sabri Benkahla is not a terrorist.” Nonetheless, the court applied Section 3A1.4, which subjected Benkahla to an advisory sentence range of 210 to 262 months, after finding that the government's investigation in the case targeted specific terrorism offenses and that Benkahla's false statements actually obstructed that investigation.

Although the district court ultimately decided to downward depart and place Benkahla within a Guideline range of 121 to 151 months, its analysis, which the Fourth Circuit endorsed, is disconcerting because it significantly eases the government's burden to prove that obstruction of justice convictions warrant the application of the terrorism enhancement. Based on the Fourth Circuit's deferral to the district court opinion, defendants who are not convicted of crimes that directly involve terrorism and are unaware that their testimony is obstructing a terrorism investigation can receive a sentence of up to 262 months of imprisonment. In this case, there is a shocking disparity between the 33- to 41-month advisory sentencing range Benkahla would have received for a non-terrorism-related obstruction offense and the 210- to 262-month sentencing range imposed for obstructing an investigation into a federal crime of terrorism. The Fourth Circuit's overzealous use of Section 3A1.4, Note 2 in Benkahla indicates that the United States Sentencing Commission needs to reevaluate the obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement.

Previous
Previous

Dickey v. State: Jury Instruction on Drug Use and its Concomitant Effect on Eyewitness Credibility

Next
Next

Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.: How to Utilize Rule 502 to Prevent Inadvertent Disclosure and Reduce Discovery Costs in an Age of Electronically Stored Information