Waldburger v. CTS Corporation: Ensuring the Plaintiff’s Day in Court as a Matter of Principle

Jess Kyle

In Waldburger v. CTS Corporation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Federally Required Commencement Date (“FRCD”) provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) preempted North Carolina's ten-year statute of repose for real property claims. The plaintiffs were thus empowered to bring their nuisance claims under state law against a manufacturer allegedly responsible for contamination of their properties with hazardous substances. The Waldburger court characterized the case as primarily a matter of statutory interpretation, albeit in the context of preemption, and both the majority and dissent performed the same two-step interpretive exercise of plain meaning analysis and a conditional turn toward legislative history. The court did not, however, spell out the more specific principles of interpretation within its broader interpretive method that justified its own conclusion over any others. As the case goes to the Supreme Court of the United States, the principled grounds distinguishing the majority's conclusion as correct remain regrettably unclear.

This Note seeks to clearly articulate why the Fourth Circuit's conclusion is the right one, and elaborates on the Waldburger majority's reasoning as necessary to this task. Further, this Note argues that the Supreme Court should affirm the Waldburger holding for the following three reasons. First, the Fourth Circuit's decision is supported by a flexible approach to plain meaning analysis that appropriately searches for “public” meaning and avoids absurdity. Second, the Waldburger outcome reflects a more credible use of legislative history to effectuate Congress's purpose in enacting the FRCD. Third, the “presumption against preemption” has substantially less weight in this case given certain anomalous features of the FRCD. These considerations support affirming Waldburger, and the Supreme Court would thereby better equip a plaintiff victim of long-latency injuries caused by toxic substances to have her day in court.

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Woollard v. Gallagher: Normalizing the Fourth Circuit’s Approach to Second Amendment Challenges