Ocasio v. United States: Why the Hobbs Act Punishes Co-conspirator Extortion

Joshua T. Carback

State and local corruption is a national problem. Over the past four decades, the United States Department of Justice increased its efforts to combat political corruption by using a variety of statutory tools, the most important of which is the Hobbs Act. Since the passage of the Hobbs Act, the United States Supreme Court has broadened its interpretation of the statute in response to prosecutorial innovation aimed at combatting political corruption. Ocasio v. United States presents a case of great importance to the Supreme Court's Hobbs Act jurisprudence. The case concerns defendant Samuel L. Ocasio, a Baltimore police officer convicted of violating the Hobbs Act by engaging in a kickback scheme. The issue currently on appeal before the Supreme Court is whether the Hobbs Act's anti-extortion provision, under which Ocasio was convicted, contemplates acts directed against co-conspirators, or merely third parties outside of criminal conspiracies. The text of the Hobbs Act, its legislative history, and strong public policy considerations all support a broad construction of its anti-extortion provision as encompassing co-conspirator extortion. Therefore, the Supreme Court should affirm the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision, uphold Ocasio's conviction, and preserve the Justice Department's ability to fight extortion of coconspirators with the Hobbs Act.