Sieglein v. Schmidt: Securing the Legitimacy of All Children Created Through Assisted Reproductive Technology

Gabrielle C. Phillips

Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) is steadily becoming more popular in the United States; in nearly twenty years, the use of ARTs tripled. ARTs are particularly popular in Maryland, where ART use exceeds the national average. ARTs have even made their mark on the American media, for example, when the public learned about “Modern Family” star Sofia Vergara's legal battle with her ex-husband over their frozen embryos. Presumptively, lawsuits of this sort are becoming more prevalent because ART use is increasing, while statutes related to ARTs are limited and outdated. Initially, these statutes were created to prevent the illegitimacy of children conceived through artificial insemination. Today, however, there are many ARTs: in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), where an egg is “fertiliz [ed] outside of the body”; zygote intrafallopian transfer, where an egg fertilized outside of the body is placed in the fallopian tube; gamete intrafollopian transfer, where eggs and sperm are placed in the fallopian tube, causing fertilization to occur within the body; and intracytoplasmic sperm injection, where fertilization occurs outside of the body by injecting sperm into the egg. Additionally, there are *818 artificial insemination and gestational surrogacy. Nonetheless, some ART statutes are written to apply to only one ART--artificial insemination--leaving other ARTs without statutory recognition.

In Sieglein v. Schmidt, the Court of Appeals of Maryland modernized Maryland's artificial insemination statute by determining that the statute encompasses more ARTs than artificial insemination alone. This Note's analysis of the court's reasoning comprises three assertions: (1) the court correctly extended the application of Maryland's artificial insemination statute; (2) the court erred when it identified “artificial insemination” as ambiguous due to there being multiple methods of artificial insemination; and (3) the court erred when it resolved the ambiguity of “artificial insemination” by interpreting the term as encompassing all ARTs, beyond the different forms of artificial insemination. The court should have reasoned that the term “artificial insemination” is ambiguous because giving the term its plain meaning would not effectuate the purpose of the artificial insemination statute--to minimize the illegitimacy of children. Nevertheless, the shortcomings of Maryland's artificial insemination statute cannot be corrected by court holdings; the statute needs to be amended by the General Assembly of Maryland.