Shawe v. Elting: The Imperfect Sale of TransPerfect Global, Inc.

Sarah M. Samaha

In Shawe v. Elting, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Court of Chancery properly exercised its equitable powers under Delaware’s custodian statute when, upon finding the presence of shareholder and director deadlock, it appointed a custodian to sell a massively profitable corporation to a third party. Phillip Shawe and Elizabeth Elting were the co-founders, co-CEOs, and the only two directors of TransPerfect Global, Inc. The closely held corporation was structured such that Shawe and Elting behaved as fifty-fifty owners of the company. In the absence of a written agreement governing the rights of stockholders, the personal and business relationships between Shawe and Elting devolved into irresolvable dysfunction, and the parties were left with no intra-corporate recourse.6 In the litigation that ensued, the Court of Chancery found that the deadlock between Shawe and Elting satisfied the threshold requirements of Section 226 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) and appointed a custodian to force a sale of the multi-million dollar corporation to a third party, despite Shawe’s objections.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that the custodian statute’s grant of power was broad enough to authorize the Court of Chancery to issue such a remedy. The Delaware Supreme Court erred in two respects. First, the court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s expansive reasoning with respect to the “irreparable harm” requirement of Section 226(a)(2). In doing so, it ignored longstanding jurisprudence requiring a demonstration of imminent insolvency or loss of revenue to the corporation in question, and instead accepted the Court of Chancery’s proposition that irreparable harm may encompass things like severely diminished employee morale, client skepticism, and failure to benefit from proposed acquisitions. The court focused on this erroneous interpretation of irreparable harm expansively, despite the fact that custodianship was warranted regardless under Section 226(a)(1). This Note argues that this nonessential dictum seems to have been used to illustrate some degree of proportionality between the alleged harm to the corporation and the extremity of the remedy ordered.

Second, the court improperly affirmed the Court of Chancery’s grant of expansive custodial authority. Section 226 jurisprudence indicates the reluctance with which Delaware courts have ordered the intrusive custodianship remedy, and emphasizes the principle that a custodian’s authority should be as narrowly tailored as possible. The court accepted a custodial sale as the only means of appropriate relief without first implementing viable alternative remedies. Further, in holding as it did, the court failed to recognize that the language and prior application of Section 226 does not provide stockholders with notice that a remedy as drastic as a forced sale of their company might occur, absent their consent.