Stokeling v. United States: Blurring The Line Of What Constitutes Physical Force Under The Elements Clause Of The Armed Career Criminal Act

Taylor Hallowell

In Stokeling v. United States, the Court addressed whether the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) encompasses Florida’s robbery offense, which requires an offender to use force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance. Although the Court in Johnson v. United States (Johnson I) declined to apply the common law definition of “force” to interpret whether a battery qualifies as a predicate offense under the elements clause of the ACCA, the Court in Stokeling relied on the common law definition of force when considering a robbery conviction in the same context. As a result, the Court held that all state robbery statutes requiring a defendant to use force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance categorically qualify as “violent felon[ies]” under the ACCA’s elements clause—no matter how minimal that force is. The Court incorrectly decided the case, because the minimal amount of force that can satisfy Florida robbery does not fit the definition of “physical force” set forth by the Court in Johnson I. The Court also failed to align its holding with the underlying purpose of the ACCA8 and misconstrued the statutory history of the ACCA. Lastly, the Court erroneously decided the case on broad grounds that overlooked idiosyncrasies of Florida robbery, such as minimal force being sufficient and merely requiring offenders to carry a firearm for armed robbery.