Judicial Interpretation in Parliamentary Affairs to Prevent a Coup D’état

Rivka Weill

The Yuli Edelstein decision of March 2020 was unprecedented for Israel as well as in comparative terms. The Israeli Supreme Court not only scheduled the date of a parliamentary vote for the first time but did so for the vote on replacing the Israeli Parliament’s (Knesset) most senior office holder—the Speaker, who controls the Knesset’s agenda. In the parliamentary arena, timing determines outcome because transitory coalitions constantly form to decide legislative agendas. Timing is even more critical regarding the election of the Knesset Speaker because once a Speaker is elected, they cannot be removed before the next general election except for cause and with the support of seventy-five percent of Members of the Knesset (“MKs”).

The pace and magnitude of the unfolding drama were breathtaking. The Court heard the political parties demanding the vote within the first business day after the submission of their petition. Within the next twenty-four hours, the Court charged the Speaker, Edelstein, with calling a plenum vote to choose a new Speaker within forty-eight hours. Towards the expiration of the deadline, Edelstein resigned without compliance. Never before had a Knesset Speaker resigned in protest while refusing to uphold a court order. While the Court’s President stated that the rule of law has never been so gravely violated, Edelstein claimed that he “prevented a civil war.” Every governmental branch viewed the other as damaging core democratic principles and attempting a coup. The revolutionary nature of this clash between the legislative and judicial branches bears great historical and comparative significance and should be thoroughly scrutinized.